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ABSTRACT
Commencing with a brief historical overview of detention of children in 
South Africa, and legislative attempts to curb its use, this article reviews all 
forms of deprivation of liberty under the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 and 
attempts to assess at a practical level whether – or not – progress is being 
made in the quest for the minimal use of deprivation of liberty.
1.  Introduction
‘The government will, as a matter of urgency, attend to the tragic and 
complex question of children and juveniles in detention and prison. The 
basic principle from which we will proceed from now onwards is that we 
must rescue children of the nation and ensure that the system of criminal 
justice must be the very last resort in the case of juvenile offenders.’1
Providing alternatives for children in prison was one of the very earliest 
policy objectives of Government of National Unity that took office 
in 1994, and one the first enactments of the new government at the 
start of democracy concerned the release of children from prisons.2 
The implementation of the measure was a failure, however, due to 
a lack of appreciation of the inadequacy of alternatives to custodial 
confinement in prison (places of safety usually reserved for children in 
need of care and protection), a somewhat intransigent magistracy used 
to wholly unfettered discretion in matters relating to detention, and 
a loss of public sympathy when released child offenders committed 
serial offences.
* BA LLB (Stell); LLM (UCT); LLD (UWC); Professor, Faculty of Law, University of the 
Western Cape and Faculty of Law, University of Leiden.
1 Nelson Mandela on the occasion of the opening of the first Parliament after the 
elections in 1994. See A Skelton ‘Children locked up: Towards detention as a matter 
of last resort’ in M Carnelley and S Hoctor Law Order and Liberty: Essays in Honour 
of Tony Mathews (2011) 207, 213.
2 J Sloth-Nielsen ‘No child should be caged – closing doors on the detention of 
children’ (1995) 8 SACJ 47.
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The Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 was re-amended shortly 
afterwards, to once again permit detention of juveniles in prisons, 
albeit with some restrictions. These limitations related to the nature 
of the offence, the age of the child (which was set at 14 years or 
older), and a list of factors to be taken into account by the presiding 
officer (such as the health status of the child, the risk of the child 
causing harm to other persons awaiting trial in a place of safety, and 
the disposition of the accused to commit offences).3
The dust having settled after this initial foray into (piecemeal) 
juvenile justice reform, practical steps towards putting in place the 
building blocks for a new juvenile justice system began to take off, 
coinciding (deliberately) with the reform process towards developing 
a comprehensive juvenile justice4 system being pursued under the 
auspices of the South African Law Commission (now South African 
Law Reform Commission). As is well known, the Law Commission 
completed the drafting process such that a Bill could be introduced to 
Parliament in 2002 although the parliamentary progress with the Bill 
stalled for some years after trenchant parliamentary debates during 
2003. (The Bill was completed in 2008, and promulgated with effect 
from 1 April 2010 as the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.)
In 2006, the Community Law Centre and Open Society Foundation 
for South Africa hosted a conference5 to explore what progress had 
been made, and what challenges remained, with the aim to spur policy 
makers and Parliamentarians to re-start the evidently stalled process of 
deliberating upon the Child Justice Bill that had been discussed last in 
2003. A review of developments relevant to the deprivation of liberty 
of children was a core theme at this conference. One contribution in 
particular dwelt on children deprived of their liberty in prisons and 
in secure care centres, which had by then emerged as the institutions 
destined to house awaiting trial children,6 and which fell under the 
auspices of the Department of Social Development.7 As at March 
3 J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Pre-trial detention of children revisited: amending section 29 of the 
Correctional Services Act’ (1996) 9 SACJ 60. See also J Sloth-Nielsen ‘The influence 
of international law on South Africa’s juvenile justice reform process’ unpublished 
LLD thesis, (University of the Western Cape) (2001), for a comprehensive analysis of 
developments between 1994 and 2001.
4 This article uses the terms ‘juvenile justice’ and ‘child justice interchangeably’, 
although the final decision was to use the less labelling term ‘child justice’ as the 
title of the Act. 
5 Child Justice Alliance and Open Society Foundation for South Africa Conference 
Report: Child Justice in South Africa: Children’s Rights Under Construction (2006).
6 This is discussed in more detail infra.
7 A Dissel ‘Children in detention pending trial and sentence’ in Conference Report op 
cit (n5) 113 -125. For a more detailed overview of developments during the period 
1998 – 2006, see Skelton op cit (n1).
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2006, it was recorded that there were 1173 children awaiting trial in 
prisons around the country, and a further 1556 awaiting trial in secure 
care facilities.8
With the position as at 2006 as a starting point, this article takes 
forward the theme of deprivation of liberty in the context of child 
justice. The intention is to locate the bland constitutional injunction 
to use deprivation of liberty only ‘as a last resort and if so, for the 
shortest appropriate period of time’9 in a what, in global terms, is 
a contextually sensitive and relativist space: the respective meanings 
of ‘last resort’ and ‘shortest appropriate period’ are by no account 
axiomatic.10
The section that follows describes the array of settings in which 
deprivation of liberty relative to child justice in South Africa is to 
be situated and conceptualised, and details the legislative context. A 
fourth section reviews progress and challenges, before concluding.
2.  The deprivation of liberty landscape
2.1  Police custody
Contact with the police and potential detention in police custody (where 
children are arguably most at risk)11 constitutes a given in virtually 
every country in the world as it is normally the entry point to the child 
justice system. Minimal use of pre-trial detention in police custody 
has long been furthered by provisions under criminal procedural law 
requiring that a detained person be brought to court before the expiry 
of 48 hours, in order that the legality of the detention be confirmed 
and options for release on bail or otherwise considered.
The Law Commission was alert to the dangers children face whilst 
in police custody, as also of the fact that services are not available 
to children detained in police cells: access to education, health care 
services, and visits by parents and families to mention the most 
obvious, are wholly lacking. The 1994 amendments to the Correctional 
Services Act 8 of 1959 implemented in May 1995 prohibited the referral 
8 Comprehensive data on children deprived of their liberty as a sentence at the same 
date is not readily available.
9 Section 28(1)(g), drawn substantially from art 37(b) of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (1989).
10 Skelton op cit (n1) 218 details how constitutional drafters baulked at the suggestion 
that the phrase be framed as detention for the shortest possible period of time as 
likely to be too restrictive, and opted instead for shortest appropriate period of 
time.
11 The death of young Neville Snyman at the hands of an adult whilst being detained 
in police custody for a petty offence led to a public outcry and is described by 
Skelton op cit (n1) 212 as ‘a watershed moment’ for child justice reform.
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of a child to await trial in police custody after first appearance in 
court, and introduced shorter detention limits in police custody even 
before first appearance in court for younger children (those aged 
below 14 years could be detained only for 24 hours). Further, the 1996 
re-amendments to the Correctional Services Act (which permitted once 
again the pre-trial detention of children in prison) continued to outlaw 
the referral of a child back to police custody after a first appearance 
in court (albeit that this legal rule was all too frequently breached, 
and had to be trenchantly motivated for in order to be retained).12 
The Child Justice Act steadfastly maintains this position: s 26(3) which 
provides for placement of a child after first appearance does not list 
placement in police custody as an option, referring only to referral to 
a child and youth care centre or to a prison.
As real time data on the detention of children in police custody 
is not kept or made available, it is unclear whether the decade old 
prohibition on post-appearance detention of children in police custody 
is still adhered to.13 In the late 1990s and even thereafter, monitoring 
visits to police cells took place in various parts of South Africa to 
ascertain whether children were being illegally detained as awaiting 
trial prisoners there, and inspections revealed all too often that this 
was indeed the case.14 There is potentially a need for such ad hoc 
monitoring to be resumed by an independent body to ensure that 
children are not detained post first appearance in police custody in 
contravention of the law.
Four further provisions seek to give effect to the ‘last resort’ and 
‘shortest period of time’ principle in the context of deprivation of 
12 Personal observations: the author was for a while contracted by the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development to monitor the pre-trial detention of 
children around the country, including detention in police cells. At the time, regular 
reports were provided to the Department of children found awaiting trial in police 
custody.
13 No data collection method is in place to distinguish children in police cells prior 
to, and after, first appearance in court, and the length of time spent in police 
custody. Nor is current police data useful as is illustrated by the presentation of 
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development’s 2nd Annual Report on 
the Inter-sectoral Implementation of the Child Justice Act (April 2011 - March 2012) 
(2012). This is because police data does not distinguish the number of children 
taken into custody from the number of charges against children recorded. Since 
a child could be arrested for multiple charges, the data proved wholly inadequate 
(see Badenhorst Second Year of the Child Justice Act Implementation: Dwindling 
Numbers (2012). Child Justice Alliance Research Report 8.
14 Various reasons were given: ignorance of justice officials as to the content of the 
law, convenience as police cells are often located close to the court where the child 
must next appear, whereas alternative care facilities required sometimes extensive 
transport and sometimes vast distances to be travelled, and arguments that the 
child could be closer to his or home and family, juxtaposed against the possibility 
of awaiting trial periods being spent sometimes in a different town altogether.
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liberty and police custody. The first of these relates to the use of 
arrest in the first place. The Act restricts the use of arrest for certain 
minor offences,15 providing that specified compelling reasons must 
be present justifying an arrest before a child accused of one of these 
offences is deprived of liberty via arrest.16
Second, the general principle is affirmed that even where an 
arrest has been effected for a schedule 1 offence, the police official 
must (where appropriate) release the child into the care of a parent, 
guardian or appropriate adult before the child’s first appearance at a 
preliminary inquiry.17 Where the offence is more serious, the police 
may still release the child before first appearance into the custody of 
a suitable adult with the consent of the prosecutor.
Third, the release of the child arrested for a schedule 1 offence from 
police custody as specified above is ‘incentivised’ via the mechanism 
of s 22(2). This section requires the investigating officer, in the 
instance that the child has not been released prior to first appearance, 
to provide the inquiry magistrate with a written report giving reasons 
15 Section 20. The offences are set out in sch 1 to the Act. The use of a summons or a 
written notice to appear in court are provided as alternatives to securing attendance 
by means of an arrest.
16 These are: where the police official has reason to believe that the child has no fixed 
address; where the police official has reason to believe that the child will continue 
to commit offences unless he or she is arrested; where the police official has reason 
to believe that the child poses a danger to any person; where the offence is in the 
process of being committed; or where the offence is committed in circumstance as 
set out in National Instruction (s 29(1)(a)-(e)) of the Child Justice Act. The National 
Instruction (no. 17) (published under GN 759 GG 33508, 2010/9/2 adds three further 
circumstances justifying an arrest, namely where the child has absconded from 
foster care, from a child and youth care centre, or from temporary safe care; where 
the child is likely to destroy or tamper with evidential material relating to the 
offence; and where the child is deemed likely to interfere with the investigation into 
the offences unless arrested (par 8(3)(ii), (v) and (vi)).
17 Section 21(2)(a). Iin respect of offences referred to in schedule 1 or 2, a prosecutor 
may release the child on bail prior to first appearance thereby limiting the period 
of detention in police custody: s 21(2)(b). Strangely, s 21(2)(a) is to all intents and 
purposes repeated in s 22(1) though there are minor differences. The heading of 
s 21 is titled ‘Approach to be followed when considering the release or detention 
of a child after arrest, whilst s 22 is the more substantive ‘Release of child on 
written notice into the care of a parent, appropriate adult or guardian before first 
appearance at the preliminary inquiry; further, s 22 adds the requirement that 
release be considered ‘as soon as possible’ (unless the parent, an appropriate adult 
or guardian cannot be found or is not available and all reasonable efforts have 
been made to locate the parent or appropriate adult or guardian or unless there is 
a substantial risk that the child may be a danger to any other person or to himself 
or herself). A similar schema is deployed at s 26 and 27 in part 2 of this chapter 
of the Act, dealing with pre-first appearance placement out from police custody 
to a child and youth care centre. Again the division into two sections (‘Approach 
to be followed’ and ‘Placement of a child who has not been released before first 
appearance’) is evident. 
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why the child could not be released and the legislatively grounded 
factors preventing the release that were at play. The South African 
Police Service National Instruction (hereafter ‘National Instruction’) 
provide for this,18 requiring that Form SAP 583(c) be filed in the police 
docket. The etiquette ‘disincentive’ relates to the additional paperwork 
that the police have to complete where they fail to release a child 
charged with a schedule 1 offence before first appearance in court.19
Fourth, the police official must, prior to first appearance, consider 
placing a child who is in detention in police custody in a suitable 
child and youth care centre (depending on the age of the child and 
the offence for which he or she is charged).20 Note that the language 
of this section is peremptory: the police official must consider this 
possibility, in lieu of keeping the child in police custody. The underlying 
principle21 is that where deprivation of liberty is necessitated, the 
least restrictive form of such detention must be employed, and that 
detention in a child and youth centre is preferable to detention in a 
police cell or lock-up.22
On analysis, there appear to be stringent legal provisions curbing 
the use of deprivation of liberty by the police,23 bolstered by a 
National Instruction in which the parameters of dealing with children 
to avoid police custody, or restrict its length, are meticulously spelt 
out (veritably in bold, underline and italic in the published text!). An 
analysis of the efficacy of this highly regimented legislative approach 
to police detention is discussed in conclusion.
18 See para 10(6)(a)(iv). 
19 Badenhorst op cit (n13) ascribes this as one factor that has led to dwindling number 
of children being taken into custody.
20 Section 26(2).
21 Stated upfront in s 26(1).
22 This legislative scheme is substantially augmented in the National Instruction as 
regards the duty to establish whether there is a child and youth care centre within 
a reasonable distance of the police station, whether there is a vacancy at the centre, 
transporting the child to the centre, handing over the child to the person receiving 
the child at the child and youth care centre, providing listed documentation, and 
filling in certain forms: see National Instruction 10(6)(a) and some of the Forms 
referred to therein.
23 The analysis here does not deal with the inclusion of alternative methods of securing 
the appearance of the (child) accused in court, such as summons or written notice 
to appear, mainly because these methods are ‘optional extras’ and not incentivised 
as alternatives to arrest in any way.
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2.2  Child and youth care centres
2.2.1  Places of safety and secure care facilities
The drafting of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and the Child Justice 
Act 75 of 2008 ultimately occurred almost in parallel, although two 
separate projects committees of the Law Commission spearheaded 
the processes, and two different parliamentary Portfolio Committees 
ultimately oversaw finalisation of the legislation. There was substantial 
interplay between the two processes and for the most part, at least as 
regards the specifics of the Child Justice Act, the provisions (on paper) 
mesh neatly. A major intersecting fulcrum is around the alternatives to 
deprivation of liberty in prisons and police cells.
Earlier, mention was made of places of safety, designated to 
house mostly children in the care and protection system, but also 
designated as alternative facilities which were able to receive 
awaiting trial children since the time of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977.24 The saga of ill-equipped places of safety being used for 
the detention of children who could not await trial in prison after 
legislative changes limited this possibility early in the democratic era 
was referred to above.
The concept of ‘secure care centres’ for awaiting trial children 
was an explicit outcome of the reintroduction of the possibility of 
detention of awaiting trial children in prisons in 1996. Secure care 
was conceptualised as an alternative to detention in so-called adult 
prisons, and became a policy objective of the Department of Social 
Development, which was regarded as the lead government department 
responsible for awaiting trial children. It could be seen as a face-saving 
response to the volte-face that the return of awaiting trial children to 
prison necessitated. Indeed, the regulations to the then Child Care Act 
74 of 1983 were amended in February 1998 to provide for a definition 
of a ‘secure care facility’ so as to create a (tenuous) legislative basis 
for their designation and/or development.25 Even after the demise 
of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Youth at Risk (IMC), an inter-
sectoral cabinet committee set up to deal with the crisis of the children 
released from prison in 1995, the goal of developing a reasonably 
equitably geographically spread suite of secure care facilities in all 
24 See s 71, now repealed.
25 A ‘secure care facility’ was intended to be a secure therapeutic environment and 
not a ‘kiddie prison’; in the view of the then Inter-Ministerial Committee on Youth 
at Risk (IMC) they were not necessarily to be developed only for awaiting trial 
children but for children generally in need of a secure care environment. See J Sloth-
Nielsen ‘A short history of time: charting the contribution of social development 
service delivery to enhance child justice 1996-2006’ in Child Justice in South Africa: 
Children’s Rights Under Construction op cit (n5) 17, 22; see also Skelton op cit (n1) 
216. 
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nine provinces of South African remained at the forefront of policy, as 
this would provide answer to the political concerns about detaining 
children in (adult) prisons. The location of the duty to identify and fund 
these was also cemented at this time: it would be the Department of 
Social Development’s responsibility rather than Correctional Services, 
Justice or any other potential stakeholder.26
Secure care facilities have generally been commissioned through 
two routes:
(1) identifying dedicated (departmental) places of safety as secure 
care facilities for the reception and accommodation of awaiting 
trial youth and ensuring that their physical security was fit for 
purpose;27 and
(2) commissioning of facilities, all built by provincial departments, 
and either managed by provincial departments or managed by 
private contractors.28
The nomenclature ‘secure care facility’ has in the intervening 
decade to an extent been superceded by developments related to the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005, as alluded to above. The Children’s Act 
contains a dedicated chapter on child and youth care centres, a term 
which includes the full range of residential care facilities for children 
(orphanages, children’s homes, places of safety, drug rehabilitation 
centres and so forth), in order to minimise the often labelling 
terminology sometimes previously encountered (the AB home for 
abandoned girls, the CD centre for adolescents with mental health 
problems …). The distinguishing factors between all the many forms 
of residential care in child and youth care facilities, according to the 
Children’s Act, is the programme or programme mix for which the 
facility is registered. Amongst the programmes for which registration 
can be granted is for the ‘reception, development and secure care of 
26 Although policy formulation would take place at national level, the sourcing of 
funding, commissioning and management of facilities would lie with the provincial 
departments.
27 Concerns had been, and are, regularly raised about the physical security 
arrangements necessary to minimise the risk of absconding or escape. 
28 That this raises the spectre of what for adults are ‘privatised prisons’ is noted, but 
fall beyond the scope of this article. Badenhorst op cit (n13) 13-14 advises that the 
private company BOSASA (in Northern Sotho, the word Bosasa means “the future”) 
was operating 11 secure care facilities as at 2012. Skelton op cit (n1) 219 notes that 
by the time the National Development Plan was released for public comment in 
2010, each province had at least one secure care facility. 
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children awaiting trial or sentence.’29 Hence, any discussion of the 
‘deprivation of liberty landscape’ necessarily requires an examination 
of the provisions of the Children’s Act, in addition to the Child Justice 
Act, the latter spelling out when deprivation of liberty in a child 
and youth care centre may be ordered, and the former identifying 
the minimum norms and standards applicable to governance and 
management of these facilities.30 The Child Justice Act does not 
differentiate between places of safety, secure care facilities and child 
and youth care facilities, but uses the nomenclature of the Children’s 
Act: thus s 29, titled ‘Placement in a child and youth care centre’, 
enables a decision to be made by the presiding officer to remand a 
child alleged to have committed an offence to a child and youth care 
centre to await trial, and in doing so he or she must have regard to 
the appropriateness of the level of security of the child and youth 
care centre when regard is had to the seriousness of the offence. This 
actually permits referral to any child and youth care centre mentioned 
in the Children’s Act, albeit that the specific centre would notionally 
have had to be registered as a facility offering a programme for the 
reception, development and secure care of children in terms of an 
order under s 29 or Chapter 10 of the Child Justice Act. 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development reported 
in 2011 that there are 28 child and youth care centres offering a secure 
care programme in South Africa. They reported that three additional 
facilities had been completed at the time of the report (June 2011), but 
were then not fully operational.31
2.2.2  Reformatory schools
The 1996 IMC study ‘In Whose Best Interests’ opened up for scrutiny 
the entire alternative care system, including institutions relevant to the 
29 Section 191(2)(h) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Sections 191(2) of this Act 
provide that, “(2) A child and youth care centre must offer a therapeutic programme 
designed for the residential care of children outside the family environment, which 
may include a programme designed for … (i) the reception, development and secure 
care of children with behavioural, psychological and emotional difficulties; ( j) the 
reception, development and secure care of children in terms of an order — (i) under 
section 29 or Chapter 10 of the Child Justice Act, 2008; [or] (ii) in terms of section 
156(1)(i) placing the child in a child and youth care centre which provides a secure 
care programme; …’.
30 Along the lines of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Juveniles 
Deprived of Their Liberty (1990).
31 Op cit (n13).
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juvenile justice system as sentencing options, and so-called industrial 
schools (or schools of industry).32
Industrial schools were not used directly for sentenced children, 
but often recommended by probation officers as a residential option 
in criminal cases involving children (especially younger children). The 
criminal matters would then be ‘converted’ into a care and protection 
inquiry under the then Child Care Act 74 of 1983, so that the desired 
residential ‘sentence’ could be made an order of the children’s court 
via the Child Care Act. This complicated scheme, which also saw the 
respective facilities fall under the jurisdiction of provincial education 
departments for historical reasons, was overhauled in its entirety in 
the process of designing an alternative residential care system for the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005.
It was further agreed at executive level, in around 2005, that control 
of what had been termed industrial schools and reform schools would 
shift from the Department of Education to the Department of Social 
Development.33 The Children’s Act encapsulates this policy decision, 
by requiring the transfer of facilities from the Department of (now) 
Basic Education within two years of the Children’s Act coming into 
force.34
Both reformatories35 and schools of industry, now being termed 
child and youth care centres in accordance with the terminology of the 
Children’s Act, are relevant to deprivation of liberty insofar as they are 
residential sentencing options which fall squarely under the rubric of 
deprivation of liberty (highlighted by the use of the word ‘compulsory 
residence’ in s 76 of the Child Justice Act, which concerns the 
imposition of a sentence to a child and youth care centre). Indeed, in S 
v CKM36 the court noted that such referrals ‘amount to an involuntary 
compulsory admission to a facility’ and that they constitute ‘a serious 
invasion of the child’s rights to freedom of movement and decision 
making’.37
32 Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. This study was undertaken by 
the IMC, and was a watershed for revealing all manner of abuses in the alternative 
residential care system. See Sloth-Nielsen op cit (n5) 17-26. 
33 The policy drivers of this included that they were ‘cinderella’ institutions in the 
large Department of Education, that the reformatory programmes, based on dubious 
educational foundations, did not serve the desired (or any) purposes, that norms 
and standards or care and of social reintegration were not optimal and so forth. 
34 In terms of s 196(3). The applicable date was 1 April 2012.
35 Committal to a reform school could be imposed on child offenders in terms of s 290 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, until its repeal by the Child Justice Act.
36 2013 (2) SACR 303 (GNP) at paras 7, 15.
37 Rule 19 of the United Nations Standard Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the ‘Beijing Rules’) are to similar effect regarding the deprivation of liberty 
of children in treatment facilities.
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2.2.3  The legislative scheme for alternative residential care in 
the Child Justice Act
The Child Justice Act (for the most part)38 conceives of alternatives to 
release as constituting deprivation of liberty, quite correctly if regard 
is had to international standards and definitions, and to the reality that 
children are not free to leave when placed in residential care. However, 
different approaches characterise the legislative scheme for pre-trial 
detention in child and youth care centres (read: secure care facilities 
and possibly other institutions) and for sentencing (read: reformatory 
schools and possibly the old schools of industry).39
In relation to pre-trial detention, detention in child and youth care 
centres is posited as the alternative to prison and to detention in police 
custody (where the child cannot be, or is not, released). This is evident 
from the requirement that the police consider placement in a child and 
youth care centre even before the preliminary inquiry in preference 
to placement in a policy cell or lock up.40 It is further implicit in s 29, 
which, although it lists factors41 that a presiding officer must consider 
before ordering such placement, does not restrict such deprivation to 
any list of offences, or set a minimum age limit on referral to residential 
care whilst awaiting trial (as is the case with a remand to prison to 
await trial). It can therefore be concluded that pre-trial detention in 
alternative residential care is couched in permissive terms in the Child 
Justice Act.
In contrast, residential sentences are governed by both principles 
and implicit restrictions related to the seriousness of the offence. 
The principle is stated in s 69(3), namely that a sentence involving 
compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre must be 
preceded by consideration of:
(a) the seriousness of the offence indicating that the child has a 
tendency towards harmful activities;
(b) whether the harm caused by the offence indicates that a residential 
sentence is appropriate;
(c) the extent to which the harm caused by the offence can be 
apportioned to the culpability of the child in causing or risking 
the harm; and
38 This will be explained infra.
39 This author returns to this allusion in conclusion.
40 Section 27.
41 These are the age and maturity of the child, the seriousness of the offence in question, 
the risk that the child may be a danger to himself or others, the appropriateness of 
the level of security of the child and youth care centre when regard is had to the 
seriousness of the offence allegedly committed by the child, and the availability of 
accommodation in an appropriate child and youth care centre.
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(d) whether the child is in need of a particular service provided at the 
child and youth care centre.
Although not listed, the above tends to indicate that deprivation of 
liberty in residential care as a sentence is restricted to offences deemed 
serious, and tends to suggest that the kind of offence contemplated is 
one involving violence (deduced from the words ‘harm’, as opposed to 
‘loss’ which would suggest economic offences).
Further, a sentence involving compulsory residence in a child and 
youth care centre may not be imposed without a pre-sentence report 
being provided to court.42 The specific centre to which the child is 
being sentenced must be specified by the child justice court.43 An 
implicit restriction to using residential sentences is evident from 
s 85, which requires automatic judicial review of any sentence of 
compulsory residence by a high court judge. As review of reformatory 
schools sentences was previously compulsory under the Criminal 
Procedure Act, there is copious judicial authority for the proposition 
that residential sentencing be reserved for serious offences only. 
It is evident that the provisions for the imposition of a sentence to 
residential care are by and large restrictive, although patently less so 
than is the case with a sentence of imprisonment.44
It is proposed that the differential treatment of deprivation of liberty 
in residential care in the pre-trial setting as opposed to post conviction 
in the Child Justice Act (permissive versus rather more restrictive) is 
premised (not necessarily advertently or consciously) on the historical 
differences in the institutions themselves (places of safety and secure 
care facilities versus reformatories)45 and perceptions about them by 
policy makers. Hence, reformatories were cast in an extremely negative 
light as ‘universities of crime’, confirmed in the adverse appraisal of the 
1996 IMC report ‘In whose best interests? Places of safety historically 
had not had much to do with juvenile offenders – the precise cause of 
the failure of the 1996 amendments to free children from prison – so 
could be perceived in a more benign light.46 Also, the newness of 
secure care facilities, which only begun to become a reality around 
2000, coincided with the end of the Law Commission process, and 
there was hope and expectation that these too would be fairly benign 
therapeutic environments. A final explanation for the differential 
42 Section 71(1)(b).
43 Section 76(4)(b)(1).
44 See s 77 which contains both age and offence limitations, seen together with a set 
of limiting principles in s 69(4). 
45 Schools of industry, as mentioned, were never directly utilisable as sentencing 
options.
46 Despite the many other failings identified by the IMC in its report.
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treatment of residential care pre-trial and post-conviction lies in the 
decade of concentrated of advocacy on limiting imprisonment (at all 
costs?) in the pre- trial phase particularly.
2.3  Prisons
Given the early activism around the detention of children in prisons, 
both awaiting trial and as a sentence, it is not surprising that the 
deprivation of liberty in prisons is highly regulated in the Child Justice 
Act.47 Limitations relate both to the minimum age of admission and to 
specific offences. Factors for presiding officers to weigh when ordering 
or deciding to further detain a child pre-trial in prison are additionally 
provided, and the likelihood of an eventual sentence of imprisonment 
being imposed must be present.48
As regards sentencing, the principle of last resort and shortest 
period of time finds expression in the body of the Act.49 It is also a 
principle of sentencing.50 Suffice it to say, then, that the legislative 
framework in the Child Justice Act undoubtedly puts appropriate flesh 
on the bones of the constitutional principle that deprivation of liberty 
in prisons be restricted to a last resort. It remains to turn to practice to 
discern progress and challenges.
3.  Where are we now?
3.1  Deprivation of liberty in police custody
According to all available information, the present picture can 
reliably be presented: far fewer children are being arrested and thus 
being deprived of their liberty in police custody in the first place.51 
Regarding the ‘shortest period of time’ principle, on the assumption 
that appearance before a preliminary inquiry must occur within 48 
hours of the initial detention; and that detention thereafter is permitted 
only in a child and youth care centre or a prison if the child is not 
released;52 and (again this is assumed) that no illegal detention in 
47 Substantially following the model of the 1996 Amendments to the Correctional 
Services Act via introducing age limits, offence limits and various additional criteria 
or factors to be considered.
48 See s 30(1) and 30(3). 
49 Section 77(1)(b).
50 Section 69(1). A further list of factors militating against imprisonment as a sentence 
is evident from s 69(4), including the ‘desirability of keeping the child out of prison’.
51 Department of Justice and Constitution Development op cit (n13); Badenhorst op cit 
(n13) .
52 See s 26(3)(a) and (b). Referral (even pending the conclusion of the preliminary 
inquiry) back to police custody is not an option provided by law, as previously 
stated.
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police custody is taking place after the conclusion of the preliminary 
inquiry, it can be concluded that the Child Justice Act’s legislative 
barriers to post-first-appearance- referral back to detention in police 
custody have indeed given life to this constitutional requirement.
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development53 
gives no police statistics concerning deprivation of children’s liberty. 
However, ‘dwindling numbers’ of children referred for diversion 
indicate a lower incidence of the use of arrest.
3.2  Deprivation of liberty in prisons
At the other end of the spectrum as seen from the vantage point of 
the most restrictive form of deprivation of liberty, the numbers of 
children awaiting trial in prison have dropped dramatically (to less 
than 600 per annum, it would appear).54 Further, the numbers of 
children serving sentences of imprisonment have also declined 
markedly.55 Indeed, it is contended that the Child Justice Act cannot 
take sole credit for this latter state of affairs, as the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court56 and other superior courts57 has surely 
played a role in curbing the imposition of imprisonment as a sentence, 
and as Muntingh points out, the rate of imprisonment has been in 
53 Op cit (n13).
54 Department of Justice and Constitution Development op cit (n13).
55 L Muntingh and C Ballard Report on Children in Prison in South Africa (2012) 71; 
see too the annexures attached to the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development Report op cit (n13), which indicates just at one point 550 children 
sentenced to corrections (p 44) but at another point slightly over 700 children 
sentenced to imprisonment in the period of the review.
56 Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) at para 31: ‘If there 
is an appropriate option other than imprisonment, the Bill of Rights requires that it 
be chosen. In this sense, incarceration must be the sole appropriate option. But if 
incarceration is unavoidable, its form and duration must also be tempered, so as to 
ensure detention for the shortest possible period of time’. These influential remarks 
of the highest court of the land clearly apply outside of minimum sentencing 
legislation, the striking down of which was the primary objective of the application, 
and have influenced lower court decision-making. As Skelton op cit (n1) 223 writes, 
the judgment ‘pointed out that the Constitution does not prohibit Parliament from 
dealing effectively with such [child] offenders – the fact that detention must be used 
only as a last resort in itself implies that imprisonment is sometimes necessary. 
However, the Bill of Rights mitigates the circumstances in which such imprisonment 
can happen – it must be a last (not first or intermediate) resort, and it must be for 
the shortest appropriate period.’ 
57 S v N 2008 (2) SACR 135 (SCA) at para 39, ‘if there is a legitimate option other than 
prison we must choose it, but if prison is unavoidable, its form and durationshould 
be tempered. Every day he spends in prison must be because there is no alternative’ 
(per Cameron JA). 
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decline generally.58 Nevertheless a commendable reduction has been 
achieved, in line with the principle that the most restrictive form of 
liberty is to be used the most sparingly. 
3.3  Deprivation of liberty in alternative residential facilities 
(child and youth care centres)
3.3.1  Pre-trial deprivation of liberty for children in conflict with 
the law
Regarding pre-trial detention in alternative residential care facilities, 
information is sparse. This is partly because the information is not 
centrally available but kept by departments at provincial level, and 
because the reporting to Parliament required by the Act, which could 
shed further light on recourse to deprivation of liberty in alternative 
care, has been tardy.59 The 2011 (first) Annual Report on the 
Implementation of the Child Justice Act records the admission of 8879 
children to the 3272 beds in the 28 secure care facilities in the year 
reviewed. This information is not provided in the 2012 Report, which 
only provides data on children sentenced to a child and youth care 
centre.60
Given that this is legislatively the preferred option where release is 
not ordered, as described above, given that numbers of children in 
prisons has declined, and given that the numbers of available child 
and youth care facilities with programmes that meet the criteria of 
providing secure care have risen, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that recourse to deprivation of liberty in alternative residential facilities 
has grown since 2006. This, in turn, may mean that there has not 
been reduced recourse to deprivation of liberty, but that it has been 
displaced from prisons to other facilities in the child justice system. It 
may even mean (and this cannot be proven one way or another) that 
overall, the deprivation of liberty of children in conflict with the law 
has increased, both in relation to the numbers of children deprived of 
their liberty, and the duration of such deprivation: pre-trial detention in 
prison has (since the 1996 amendments referred to in the introduction) 
been subjected to a requirement that the matter be remanded for no 
more than 14 days at a time, with the goal that the presiding officer 
enquire on a regular basis whether continued incarceration remains 
58 Muntingh, L ‘Punishment and deterrence: don’t expect prisons to reduce crime’ 
(2008) 26 SA Crime Q 3 at 5.
59 The latest available report is for the period April 2011 – March 2012.
60 A number of 353 children, a vast increase over the previous year: Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development op cit (n13) 34.
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required.61 No such enforced limitation on deprivation of liberty in 
the alternative care system existed, nor does it feature in the Child 
Justice Act. Therefore, it is possible to speculate that children might be 
spending far longer in custody in child and youth care facilities with 
no barrier to this in place.62
In addition, the statistic of 8879 admissions to child and youth care 
centres63 (of whom only 110 were sentenced to a child and youth care 
centre in that year according to the 2012 report) do seem to indicate 
rather large numbers: at the height of detention of children in prison, 
the total was less than 2800,64 and at that point secure care had yet to 
take off so that there were then far fewer admissions to the alternative 
care system. Crudely put, deprivation of liberty (albeit now in child 
and youth care facilities) seems to have at least doubled.65
3.3.2  Deprivation of liberty in child and youth care centres as 
a sentence
Facilities that were initially called secure care facilities (initially 
conceptualised as an alternative to prison for awaiting trial children) 
are evidently now increasingly being utilised as facilities for sentenced 
children. Badenhorst66 provides data showing that all the facilities 
managed by BOSASA have admitted sentenced children for the 
period 1 April 2011 – 31 March 2012. Based on information supplied 
by BOSASA, she notes that difficulties include that the current 
infrastructure in the facilities does not allow for total separation of 
sentenced children from those awaiting trial. Children share the same 
amenities such as dormitories, classes and recreational programmes 
although the content of their programmes supposedly differs. She 
also records that children who have been sentenced to imprisonment 
are, instead, delivered to BOSASA facilities to serve their sentence. As 
mentioned above, the 2012 Annual Report shows a dramatic escalation 
in the imposition of sentences to child and youth care centres, albeit 
off a low base.
61 Now s 30(4) of the Child Justice Act.
62 This assertion is somewhat supported by the facts in S v CKM 2013 (2) SACR 303 
(GNP) – see (n36) supra and (n68) infra.
63 2011 Annual Report, cited in Muntingh and Ballard op cit (n55) 15.
64 Skelton op cit (n1) 219, citing the peak in 2000.
65 The statement must of course be read with the necessary caveats, for instance the 
reliability of the 2011 data may be suspect, and of course in 2000 it is suspected that 
many children would have been detained in police custody pending trial, as earlier 
indicated.
66 Op cit (n13) 28-29.
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3.3.3  Deprivation of liberty in child and youth care centres for 
children not facing criminal charges
It has now emerged that secure care facilities have been used as 
facilities for children not facing criminal charges but in the care system. 
As highlighted above, the initial conception of secure care facilities did 
not envisage that they would be restricted to children facing criminal 
charges but would be available to accommodate all children in need 
of a secure therapeutic environment; legally there does not appear 
to be an obvious or direct impediment to mixing awaiting trial and 
sentenced children with those not facing criminal charges, insofar 
as the Children’s Act is concerned;67 though it is arguable that this 
position might be constitutionally suspect, as a possible violation 
of s 12(1)(b) of the Constitution, since the deprivation of liberty of 
children not facing criminal charges is conceivably a form of detention 
without trial, irrespective of it being dressed up as ‘treatment’.68
Nevertheless, a recent incident at a child and youth care facility 
(a secure care facility) raises alarm bells, and calls into question the 
67 See s 191(2)(i) and ( j) discussed earlier. Paragraph 14 of the National Norms and 
Standards issued in terms of the Children’s Act provides somewhat for the separation 
of certain children groups from others. It reads as follows: ‘(a) Children in secure 
care programmes must as far as reasonably possible be kept separately from 
children in other programmes. Such children must be separated at night, and where 
they are not separated during the day this must be managed as part of a residential 
care programme that provides appropriate containment. (b) Children in secure 
care programmes who are awaiting trial and children in secure care programmes 
who have been sentenced may be housed in the same facility, provided that the 
child and youth care centre is registered to provide appropriate programmes for 
such children, and that the residential care programmes provide for appropriate 
containment.’
68 The matter of S v CKM 2013 (2) SACR 303 (GNP). The case concerned three boys 
sentenced to a reform school from whence they repeatedly escaped. They were then 
transferred administratively to a secure care facility for awaiting trial youth without 
any court order and without charges having been laid against them in respect of 
which they were then awaiting trial. The first accused had been originally sentenced 
to a reformatory for an extremely minor offence of common assault, on the basis 
that the child was without parental supervision and had developed into a difficult 
child. That he might have been a child in need of care was not considered, and the 
court opined that the sentence imposed was ‘clearly, indubitably and self-evidently’ 
unjustified (at para 18), given that deprivation of liberty is constitutionally a last 
resort. In contravention of the then provisions of s 302 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, the original sentence to a reform school was not sent on automatic review. After 
C ran away, and was apprehended and transferred to the awaiting trial facility, he 
was detained for 6 months (without a warrant of detention being in place) before the 
matter was placed before a high court judge for special review. The second accused 
was convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and sentenced to the 
reform school from where he absconded and ended up in secure care for awaiting 
trial children, whilst the third accused, who had failed to participate in a diversion 
programme, was initially sentenced on the basis that he too was a troublesome 
child (the original charge was housebreaking with intent to commit an unknown 
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wisdom of this initial thinking. An investigation report has confirmed 
that69
‘on 26 and 27 August 2013 as a result of a full scale riot at Horizon Child and 
Youth Care Centre, the facility was in complete chaos. Most of the residents 
were involved and enormous damage was caused to the building, vehicles and 
equipment. They climbed on to the roof, broke several windows, damaged 
the electric fences, broke the CCTV cameras, threatened to assault staff and 
stabbed one staff member in the hand to get hold of a key. They lifted 
the paving bricks in the courtyard and used them to damage the premises 
and to keep the staff at bay. Mfuleni police as well as the Department of 
Correctional Services were called to assist to stabilise the situation.’
It is alleged that tasers were used to subdue the children.70 In an 
action brought against the Department of Social Development that had 
transferred a number of children in the care system to this facility, it is 
alleged that this has resulted in, among other things:71
‘6.1. the unnecessary stigmatisation of children, not sentenced or awaiting 
trial, but detained at facilities designed and known for that purpose;
6.2.  children being unnecessarily exposed to the influence of gangs;
6.3.  children being placed at a greater risk of exposure to violence compared 
to the risk at one of the Centres; including the risk of full scale riots; and
6.4.  children being geographically detained away from their communities 
and families when one of the [care] Centres is located near family and 
friends’.
The reasons for the increased accommodation of children in the care 
system in facilities intended initially to replace pre-trial detention in 
prisons are threefold, it is suggested. First, as noted, there were no 
crime.) Setting aside the original sentence in respect of two of the children as 
inappropriate given that they were in need of care and the constitutional principle 
of deprivation of liberty as a last resort was not adhered to, and bearing in mind the 
deprivation of liberty already endured by the third accused, the original sentence as 
set aside and replaced with a caution and discharge. The judge is further scathing 
about the detention all three children in an awaiting trial facility, in contravention of 
the original order of the court, and that they were being held there without a valid 
warrant of detention (at para 36).
69 Founding affidavit of John Smythe in Justice Alliance of South Africa v Minister of 
Social Development Western Cape and others, launched on 16 December 2013, and 
set down for hearing in March 2014. The papers for the applicants are available on 
the Justice Alliance for South Africa website (www.justicealliance.co.za). 
70 See too “Children who were allegedly shocked with electrified riot gear at a Cape 
Town facility were not all juvenile detainees but placed there by the state for care and 
protection”, the chief magistrate at Wynberg Magistrate’s Court said on Monday …. 
“The children who made complaints, and who were subsequently referred to Ottery 
Youth and Education Centre, were … not facing criminal charges”. (Legalbrief 16 
October 2013). The magistrate referred the matter to the South African Human 
Rights Commission.
71 Founding affidavit supra (n69) at para 6. The incident is linked to a vast escalation 
in violence amongst street gangs currently sweeping through the Cape Flats.
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barriers or hurdles to accommodating such children in the generic 
‘child and youth care centre’ framework drafted in the Children’s 
Act (not even a minimum age for admission). Second, the process 
of transfer of those institutions that formerly resided under the 
Department of Education to the Department of Social Development 
has been contentious and, if the papers in the Justice Alliance of South 
Africa court action72 are to be believed, bordering on mischievous.73 
Third, the ‘myth’ that the children in secure care are just the same 
as the ones in the care system continues to hold dominance, and 
provides a convenient justification for placing both groups in the same 
institution.
3.3.4  Deprivation of liberty of children who have been 
‘diverted’
It is apparent that children who have been diverted from the criminal 
justice system are also being admitted to secure care facilities. 
Badenhorst74 provides information from the 11 BOSASA operated 
facilities (from amongst the 28 facilities operating secure care 
programmes) indicating that these numbers too are on the increase, 
having risen from 179 admissions in the year 1 April 2010 to 31 March 
2011, to 429 admissions in the period from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 
2012 (211 of these in Gauteng alone).75
How could this be, one asks? Diversion, in its pure form, means 
channelling children away from the criminal justice system and 
the institutions linked to it (to avoid deprivation of liberty and 
contamination by other more hardened and seasoned youngsters in 
the criminal justice system), not steering children into it! But the seeds 
of this seemingly improbable development lie in the text of the Child 
Justice Act itself. Provision was made76 for the possibility of ‘referral to 
intensive therapy to treat or manage problems that have been identified 
72 Supra (n69).
73 It is averred that only the functions are to be transferred but that the facilities 
themselves will remain with the Department of Education (presumably to be used 
for other purposes).
74 Op cit (n13).
75 This admission of children whose cases were diverted is confirmed in the founding 
affidavit in JASA v Minister of Social Development (n69 above). Badenhorst notes 
ironically that the number of children diverted to BOSASA offered programmes (a 
for-profit organisation and residential in nature) have increased during 2011/2012 
as opposed to the decreases in the number of non-residential diversions being 
experienced by the non-profit organisations. She laments that the long standing 
service providers (not-for-profit) providing community services and non-residential 
programmes are being allowed to disintegrate.
76 In s 53(4)(c) – emphasis added.
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as a cause of the child coming into conflict with the law, which may 
include a period or periods of temporary residence’. (This type of 
diversion was indeed proposed already during the deliberations of the 
Law Commission, which was cognisant of programmes where such 
short term periods were required (such as allied to adventure therapy 
programmes and wilderness skills development programmes being 
developed or in existence at the time)).
However, by the time the parliamentary process had been concluded, 
the ‘temporary’ nature of the residence had become a period of up to 
two years where the child was aged below 14 years, and a period of 
up to four years where the child was aged between 14 and 18 years.77
Given that this deprivation of liberty is ordered without the 
safeguards of a criminal trial and a formal sentencing process, which 
culminates in a high court review where the same period is imposed as 
a sentence in terms of s 76, this development must give cause for high 
concern, and its legality subjected to careful scrutiny and, if needs be, 
legal challenge. Also, there will likely have been no guarantee of legal 
representation for the child who is deprived of liberty via diversion, 
as is more or less compulsory in trials involving children likely to be 
deprived of their liberty as a sentence.
Lest the rose-tinted spectacles still remain in place, suffice it refer 
to the recent closure of a new multi-million rand Bhisho maximum 
security facility after allegations of rape, drug abuse, suicide and 
delinquency at the centre. It was closed after an urgent court bid by a 
children’s court magistrate, assisted by Legal Aid SA.78
4.  Can we do better?
The founding affidavit in JASA describes an on-site inspection to a 
secure care facility thus:
‘To obtain access to the facility where the children were, we were frisked 
twice, and taken through another three locked gates, the first being rotating 
bars as in Pollsmoor. In fact, the security procedures for entering seemed to 
me substantially more onerous than those required to visit a detainee in the 
Pollsmoor Youth Wing for men over 18 years of age … the outside fence, 
which had a green tubular roll and electric cables on top, extended 1 metre 
below the surface to prevent tunneling … . We were shown the Security 
Control room linked to 16 CCTV cameras, which were currently being 
upgraded with 40 more cameras, 8 of them infra-red cameras which work in 
the dark … . Every classroom is locked and barred separately. When we were 
shown the classrooms and children, the teacher had physically to open the 
77 Section 53(6)(a)(i) and (ii). The Act does not indicate how a consecutive period of 
this length could at the same time be considered ‘temporary’.
78 Legalbrief 23 August 2013; see S v Goliath unreported, case number (CA&R36/2014) 
[2014] ZAECGHC 4 (17 February 2014).
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security gate to allow us to enter the classroom … . In the dormitories there 
are no toilet doors. The dormitories are also locked and barred every night 
at bedtime … . The buildings, exercise courtyard, and surrounds are all made 
out of brick and concrete, with high security fencing and spikes. There is a 
field adjacent to the facility, but we were not told if and when the children 
use it. Children are dressed in identical uniforms and escorted when they 
move between areas of the building by guards and childcare workers…[the] 
general impression of Horizon is that it is a prison-like lock down facility 
similar to the Pollsmoor Youth wing for over eighteens.’79
It seems that in the quest to limit detention in police custody and 
prisons in the child justice reform movement, the leeway was left 
for the development of prison-like institutions to take their place. 
Moreover, the tried and tested controls to limit unfettered discretion 
to admit children into detention facilities were jettisoned in relation to 
deprivation of liberty in child and youth care centres, the reformers 
having been lulled by promises of therapeutic environments that would 
be the polar opposite of prisons. Finally, deprivation of liberty in these 
institutions appears to be even less subject to judicial scrutiny and 
other forms of accountability (such as inspectorates and independent 
visitors), than the alternatives, which gives cause for great concern.
In short, both the ‘last resort’ and the ‘shortest period of time’ 
principle appear to be in jeopardy. With a further 18 facilities envisaged 
for the next medium term expenditure framework according to the 
National Development Plan as cited in Skelton,80 there is a likelihood 
that this risk will escalate, rather than abate.81
79 Founding affidavit supra (n69) at paras 94-105. The author has visited the facility 
and broadly speaking confirms this assessment. 
80 Op cit (n1).
81 Noting too that less than 600 children currently awaiting trial in prison require 
alternative accommodation; hence 18 new facilities must, to operate at capacity, 
draw in children for whom deprivation of liberty would not otherwise have 
occurred.
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